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Two Statements on the Bouvia Case 
Sta /e ll/en/ h.!" A r chhisho/J Roger M il/IOn.!" on / he Unlinilllo us Ruling hI' 
Ihe Cilli/ imlill :!nd /)is/ric/ COlirt or A p/h'1I1 A //o l\ 'ing Quadriplegic 
1:'Ii ::llhe/h BOIlI 'ili /() Star\'(' Herselr /() /)elllh 
W e have all felt th e pain and ang uish o f th e case o f Eli 7.abe th Bouvia 
durin g the pa st three years. A yo un g wo ma n. a 4ua d riplegic. he r bod y will 
ne \'e r be restored to any rea sona ble leve l o f no rmal functi o ning. 
She has ex pres sed an int e nse d esire to a vo id taking a ny no uri shment o f 
an y kind . I n a word . s he ha s d ec id ed to e nd he r li fe by refus in g to ta ke a ny 
ty pe o f food o r no u rishm e nt. Both th e hos pit a ls and th e S uperi o r C o urt 
ha d d eclared that s he di d no t ha ve the right to so te rmina te he r li fe . 
T he 2nd C ourt o f A ppeal has now rul ed that th e "rig ht o f pri vacy" 
a fford s he r full p ro tecti o n in her d ec isi o n to e nd a ll n o uri shment. 
Since the full ruling by the 2nd Court of Appeal is not a vailable at this 
writing. it is not poss ible to g ive a full critique of th e issues and the Court's 
reaso n1l1g. 
But the consist e nt teac hing o f th e Catholi c Churc h has al wa ys ta ug ht us 
our respons ibiliti es in safegua rding o ur lives. as fo ll o ws: 
Intenti o na ll y ca using o ne's own dea th . o r suicid e. is therefore equall y as wro ng as 
m urd er: suc h a n act io n o n t he part ora pe rso n is to he con side red as a rejecti o n of 
(inu's so\"cn: ign ty and itH 'ill t!, pla n. Furthermo re. suicidl' is also Oft CIl a rcfu sa l or 
l oy~ for sdL t h ~ d~ ni a l of t h~ na tura l insti nct t(i l i Y~. a !'l ig ht fro m t h~ dut i ~s of 
justice and c har it y owcd to o l1 e's ncig hhor. to \a ri o ll s com mu nit ies or to t he 
\\"hole of soc iety alth o ugh. as is gl' ll l' rall ~ ' rccogni/cd. at times the re an: 
psycho logica l fac tors rrL'~L'l1t tha t ca ll d imi nish n:s po nsihil ity 0 1" ('\"(:11 cOl11 r k t d~' 
I"L' I1Hl \"l' it. I 
T he 2 nd C o urt o f A ppeal has e nt e red a realm w he re its co mpete nce d oes 
no t lie . T he gift of li fe is prec io us . and it s a uth o r is God. Eac h o ne o f us is 
g uardian and cus to dian o f tha t precio us g ift. and we d o no t have th e 
" ri g ht" to e nd o ur life thro ug h direct acti o n - such as re fu s in g to ea t. T he 
d octo rs treating Eli n tbe th Bo uvia ha \'e maint a ined th a t she co uld - but 
wo uld no t - eat so lid foo d. Co nse4 ue ntly. t hey ha ve ha d to ta ke the 
initia ti ve in o rd er to prov ide her no u ris hment thro ugh forced feeding. 
The e rr o r of t he 2nd Co u rt o f A ppeal is fo u nd in it s pl a ei ng th e " 4 ualit y 
o f li fe" as th e prima ry c rit e ri o n w he re by a pers o n li ves o r di es. If th e 
reaso nin g o f th e Cou rt p reva ils . and a pe rso n is lega ll y permitt ed to end 
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his or her life because they perceive the quality of their life to be 
inadequate, are we far from the day when others - doctors, family 
members, judges - may actually "order" the mercy-killing of a person 
based upon the same logic? 
Because of the critical nature of this case, and the future implications 
flowing from it , I will issue a more detailed analysis and definite guidelines 
to help guide us as soon as the full decision has been studied. 
In the meantime, I ask all the members of our Archdiocese to pray for 
Elizabeth Bouvia and support her through our love. Her life is precious, 
she is valuable even if confined to bed and unable to move. She is our sister, 
and she is a member of our human family. We love you, Elizabeth, and we 
pray that you will accept our love and support as that strength which you 
need so very much. 
I Dec/aral ioll O il ElI/iIanasia. Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. June 
26. 1980. 
Extended Statement by Archbishop Roger Mahony on the Unanimous 
Ruling br the California 2nd Distriel Court of Appeal on the Case of 
Elizabeth Bouvia 
We have all felt the pain and anguish of the case of Elizabeth Bouvia the 
past few years. A young woman and a quadriplegic, her body will never be 
restored to normal functioning. Understandably , she finds her life full of 
disappointment and burden . 
Several years ago. she entered a hospital allegedly for treatment. But 
once there. she refused to eat - an action she was quite capable of at that 
time , if only someone would put the food into her mouth. She made it 
plain. moreover. that her refusal was for a suicidal purpose: she simply 
wanted to end her life of misery. 
The hospital authorities sought and obtained a Court order exempting 
them from allowing this suicidal action to be carried out under their 
auspices and with their assistance. The Court authorized them to force-
feed her by intubation until she regained enough strength to be discharged 
from the hospital. Since that time, her bodily powers have further 
diminished . Nonetheless. she has resumed taking what nourishment she 
can by mouth , even though she complains that this is becoming 
increasingly la borious by reason of na usea and vomiting and, by reason of 
aspiration into her lungs, dangerous . 
Now in a County hospital. she recently brought su it in a trial Court for 
the right to terminate intubation newly forced upon her, and to rely only 
on whatever nourishment she could take by mouth . The trial Court 
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rejected her plea, and she submitted her case to and was upheld by a Court 
of Appeal. During the appeal, she disavowed what was apparently her goal 
several years ago: to end her life. She also indicated once again her 
willingness now to continue to take whatever food she could take by 
mouth. 
Immeasurable Value of Each Individual Life 
Any effort , legal or otherwise, to resolve such issues, must begin with 
our facing the fact that the life of an innocent person cannot be measured 
against the burden which may inhere in it for that person or for others who 
must care for him. Thus, human beings have no right to decide that the 
very life of an innocent human being does not "measure up" properly, and 
therefore may be terminated as burdensome by omission or commission . 
This does not at all take away from the fact that we may indeed, and 
normally shou ld, do all we can surgically, medicinally, and in any other 
way to eliminate pain and other burdens even if eliminating those burdens 
results also in a shortening of life. 
Laws and judicial processes which ignore this immeasurable value of the 
life of each and every innocent human individual in reality undermine the 
very society they are supposed to serve . 
For once a society decides that the human life of anyone innocent 
individual can lose its va lue, and therefore that society should legally 
establish a person's right to suicide, we question at least implicitly and 
inevitably - whether we realize it o r not - the value of every person's life. 
And for cases of persons which a low "quality of life ," but without 
enough mental competency (or common sense, some would add) to end 
their lives, we shall have shack led ourselves to a cha in of log ic which forces 
us sooner or later to the conclusion that society ought to make the decision 
.liJl· such persons. 
The history of Nazi Germany exemplifi es that logic , with its e limination 
of thousands of the "feeble-minded," the politically obtuse, and, eventually 
as many Jews as the Third Reich could get its hands on. One of the German 
judges, tried at Nuremberg for his part in these "decisions," pleaded that he 
never knew death sentences based on lack of "quality of life" would come 
to "that" - the death of millions. 
In a well-known dramatization of that trial, the judge appointed by the 
Allied Nations responded, "Herr Werner, it came to 'that' the day you first 
sentenced an innocent man." So it is with judges today, as we have seen in 
our own nation only a few years ago when an "Infant Doe" was refused a 
commonplace , unburdensome, but life-saving surgery simply because the 
infant suffered Down's Syndrome. So it is even when one, in basic 
possession of one's mental powers, sentences one's self to death by way of a 
decision for suicide. Such decisions, and laws or judgments upholding 
them, invite both the degradation of individuals and murderous chaos in 
society. 
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No Duty to Add Burdens 
True , a moral a pproach which, to the contrary, va lues each human li fe 
as a pri ce less g ift can no neth eless justi fy not adding heavi ly to the burdens 
which already fill a pa tient's life. If taking food artificially, or even 
na turall y, in a patient's ho nest judgment is a so urce of signifi ca nt pain , 
di sco mfort. risk or eve n dehumanization added /() what he is already 
expe riencing or will ex perience from his co ndition , o ne can defend the 
pat ient's right to say "No mo re!" 
This is a reasonable decision wo rth y of a human being, and ninetee n 
hund red yea rs of co heren tl y developing Christian mo ral thinkin g affirm it. 
For it is not a decision to end o ne's ea rthl y life, but to tole ra te that life's 
pass ing away (as we all must so meday) rather tha n adding nell' burd ens to 
th ose a lread y prese nt in one's life . 
Indeed, society has a right - eve n an obligation - to pro tect a patient's 
right to make this eva lua ti o n of the burden in a procedure and decisions 
which follow from it. eve n thoug h at times others may disagree with a 
particular pa tient's thinking and choice in th e matter. The o pini o n of 
Justices Beac h, Rot h and Compton recently made ava ila ble appears at 
first to contain much which is supporti ve bot h of th e moral o bliga ti o n not 
to see k precisely to end a life and of th e right to refuse procedures prec ise ly 
because the y significantly add burd en. Eli za beth's prese nt willingness to 
take whatever no uri shment she can ma na ge by mouth (even th oug h she 
cannot long survive on this) would indica te prima/acie an intent to d o th e 
same. 
Dangerous Vagueness 
Unfortunately, a longside these affirmations we find scattered throu gh-
out the Court's opinion ambiguities which could undermine the m. To be 
sure, these a mbiguities are found m ostly in declara tions of public and 
professio nal policy which the Justices merel y cite. No netheless, the 
ambiguit ies remain. 
For instance , the pa tient's right to "decide" is maintained repeatedl y in 
th e Court d ec ision [cf. pages 9, 10, II], but it is not a lways clear l1 'hat the 
pa tient has a "right to dec ide": to ai m to end life? Or merely to tolerate life 's 
ending ra ther than use burdensome medica l procedures? 
Whet her or not our legal system has constructed such a "right to decide" 
is, of course, a question for lega l scholars. From the moral aspect , 
howeve r, such a lega l "right" is morally good la w if it protects the patient's 
right to discern for himself how seriouslr burdensome a procedure is to 
him or others - not if the law constructs a " right to decide" precise ly to 
aim to end one's life whether by omission or commission. 
Again,just as a physician has "a commitment ... to susta in life," bUl not 
by every possi ble means, so a lso he has "a commitment ... to ... relieve 
pain ," [page 17] but again, not by every possible m eans. From the moral 
point of view, efforts aimed precisely at shortening life are among those 
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means which society should rule out. The documents the Justices use, at 
least in the parts they quote , do not always make this clear. 
Invitations to Euthanasia 
More serious, in the last third of the text of the Opinion, the Justices 
suddenly switch signals and begin to appeal only to "quality ollile" 
considerations. They even allege, without any proof whatsoever, that 
diminished "quality of life" is the reason behind "all decisions permitting 
cessation of medical treatment or life-support proced ures" [page 19]. 
For pages , no mention is made of the burdensomeness of the intubation 
Ms. Bouvia is rejecting. Appeal is made merely to the "hopelessness, 
uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration" of her lile in its present 
condition [page 20]. She considers "her ex istence mea ningless," a nd 
cannot be faulted for so concluding [page 20]. She must be freed from "the 
ignominy, embarrassment , humiliation a nd dehuma ni zing as pects crea ted 
by her helplessness" [page 21]. "Such a life has been physically destroyed 
and its quality, dignity and purpose gone" [page 20]. 
Such remarks would seem to indicate an ideological commitment to 
euthanasia, and are peculiarly out of place in ajudicial opinion. Not that 
there is no place for ideology, religion or morality in law. But that place is 
to be established by the consent of the governed through their constitution 
or legislature , not by judicial fiat. 
What seems here to be precisely an instance of legislation by judicial fiat 
incorporates an agnostic skepticism about a God Who gives meaning to life 
even in one's suffering, and a materialistic view of man as nothing but an 
animal whose value depends on the condition of his body. Millions of 
Christians, Jews , and dedicated members of many faiths will find such 
views repugnant. 
Moreover, in imposing this distinctly partisan doctrine about 
meaninglessness and valuelessness in life, the Justices would seem to 
ignore or even move to overthrow our perennial legal tradition regarding 
the State's interest in preventing su icide. That tradition means that if a 
person is attempting to terminate his life, any society worth the na me 
"human" will take what reasonable steps it can to stop him. Whether, to 
what extent, and how such suicidal enterprises can be detected and 
thwarted can rightly be debated. 
The Justices' opinion , however , cannot be read as other than an attempt 
actually to construct legally a "right to suicide," - to give society'S blessing 
to a suicidal effort - a nd to authorize (and someday oblige?) medical 
professionals and others to assist in it. "A desire to terminate one's life is 
probably the ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy," the Court writes 
[page 23]. In particular, Justice Compton in his concurri ng opinion seems 
to reveal and revel in the euthanasic thinking of the Court, and with an 
obvious logic the other two Justices side-stepped, blatantly argues for 
suicide, not only by omission, but by commission, that is, by drugs and 
procedures aimed to kill. 
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Summary 
Society must find a way effectively to recognize both the inviolable 
sanctity of each innocent human life , and at the same time, the right of a 
patient not to have additional burdens heaped upon him in the miseries he 
is already experiencing. To achieve this moral balance, it is necessary to 
distinguish clearly between , on the one hand, the burdens inherent in the 
patient's very life , and on the other hand , burdens which a particular 
procedure will add. 
Only such a balanced approach , truly respectful of all that is most 
profoundly human , would allow for the Elizabeth Bouvias of this world to 
choose to allow death to come more quickly rather than to be subjected to 
intubation and other truly burdensome, though life-extending, procedures 
over a significant period of time. 
Thus , while true moralj ustification can be found for Elizabeth's refusal 
of intubation , any society concerned with a truly and ethically human 
approach to the problems of the dying must reject the reasoning evidently 
behind the Court's decision. As Justice Compton notes (approvingly!), 
that reasoning simply applauds and further extends "the deviation from 
that part of the oath" of Hippocrates by which physicians have sworn for 
hundreds of years never to perform abortions [page 2 in his concurring 
opinion ]. 
The Court's reasoning is an open invitation to suicide , euthanasia , and 
worse - perhaps eventually the elimination even of those who do not want 
to die . As such, it does a profound disservice to society and dramatically 
weakens society's commitment - to value and protect all human life as a 
primary goal of the human community. 
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